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FACTS ON THE GROUND AND
FEDERALISM IN THE AIR: THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL'S EFFORT TO DEFEND FEDERAL
STATUTES DURING THE FEDERALISM
REVIVAL
BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD*
In 1998, when I joined the Office of the Solicitor General as
Principal Deputy, the Supreme Court had recently launched
what has come to be called the federalism revival by striking
down federal statutes in four doctrinal categories. First, the
Court had found an anti-commandeering principle in the Tenth
Amendment, which literally says only that the states and the
people still have any powers not taken away from them;1 that
principle led the Court to strike down laws about the disposal of
radioactive waste2 and about background checks on gun buyers. 3
Second, the Court had found new limitations on the commerce
power, 4 which led it to strike down a law creating gun-free zones
* Counsel to the United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York; former Principal
Deputy and Acting Solicitor General of the United States. Prepared for Conference on
Federalism Past, Federalism Future, St. John's University School of Law, Queens, New
York, March 3, 2006. The views expressed in this essay are those of the author and do not
purport to reflect the views of the Department of Justice.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. X reads:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
2 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149, 155, 177 (1992) (invalidating
federal statute compelling the states to regulate the disposal of radioactive waste on
ground that statute violates the principle of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth
Amendment).
3 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919, 933 (opinion of the Court), 935-36
(concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor), 936 (concurring opinion of Justice Thomas)
(1997) (invalidating federal statute requiring state and local law enforcement officers to
perform background checks on prospective handgun owners on ground that statute
violates Tenth Amendment principle of state sovereignty).
4 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power "[t]o regulate commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
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around schools. 5 Third, the Court had found a broad principle of
state sovereign immunity in the Eleventh Amendment, which
literally says only that a citizen of one state may not sue another
state;6 that principle led the Court to strike down a law giving
Indian tribes the right to sue a state to compel negotiation over
casinos. 7 And fourth, the Court had found new limitations on the
power of Congress to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantees of due process and equal protection8 and struck down
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.9
It was as if a floodgate had opened, or a tidal wave was coming,
and no federal statute was safe. The task of defending the
constitutionality of federal statutes in the Supreme Court falls to
the Solicitor General.lO Facing the prospect of many more
challenges to federal statutes, the Solicitor General and his staff
needed to think about how to hold the line, or where and how to
draw a defensible line that would preserve some statutes against
the federalism attack. Several tools were available, and all of
them were used. First, of course, was reasoned argument: the
effort to understand the logic behind the developing doctrine and
to limit its application by drawing distinctions. Another
5 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (invalidating statute on the
ground that "[t]he possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic
activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of
interstate commerce" and the statute did not require any other "concrete tie to interstate
commerce").
6 U.S. CONST. amend. XI reads:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
7 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72, 76 (1996) (holding that
Congressional power to regulate Indian affairs does not include the power to abrogate the
sovereign immunity of the states protected by the Eleventh Amendment).
8 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV reads in pertinent part:
No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws ... . The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
9 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533 (1997) (invalidating statute as
beyond the enforcement power of Congress because its preventive and remedial measures
lack "proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to
be achieved").
10 The Solicitor General has the statutory obligation to "assist the Attorney General
in the performance of his duties." 28 U.S.C. § 505 (2006). Department of Justice
regulations provide that the Solicitor General is responsible for "[clonducting, or
assigning and supervising, all Supreme Court cases," 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(a) (2006), and
"authoriz[ing] intervention by the Government in cases involving the constitutionality of
acts of Congress." 28 C.F.R. § 0.21 (2006).
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important tool was to enlist the support of the states; many
states filed briefs amicus curiae in support of federal statutes,
explaining that they welcomed the assistance provided by the
federal statutes at issue and did not regard these statutes as
intrusions on state prerogatives."1 Still another tool was to select
cases for Supreme Court review that would present the statutes
in the most favorable light, choosing from among the many
available lower court cases those with the most sympathetic
facts. 12
Choosing suitable cases for Supreme Court review is a subject
that is regularly considered by the Solicitor General's Office and
not just in controversial constitutional litigation. It is known as
the "vehicle" question: in responding to a petition for certiorari,
or in deciding whether to file one, the Solicitor General is likely
to consider both whether the question presented is worthy of
Supreme Court review, and whether the particular case is a good
vehicle for presenting that question to the Court. In fact, the
Supreme Court from time to time calls for the views of the
Solicitor General on petitions for certiorari in cases where the
United States is not a party, cases involving private litigants and
state and local governments. In these cases the Solicitor
General's most important contribution can sometimes be to
explain that even though the question identified by the parties is
worthy of Supreme Court review, the case does not really present
it squarely, because procedural obstacles or factual complications
may prevent the Court from addressing it.
In defending a federal statute, however, the Solicitor General's
interest in selecting cases may be not just to find a case that
presents the issue squarely but rather to find a case that
presents the government's position in the most favorable light.
That is precisely what some of us began trying to do in some of
the federalism cases.
11 For a discussion of the active role of the New York State Attorney General in this
process, see Preeta Bansal, The Federalism Revival and Reinvigorating the "Federalism
Deal," 21 ST. JOHN'S J.L. COMM 447 (2006).
12 For the reflections of then-Solicitor General Seth Waxman on case selection
strategy in federalism cases, see Seth P. Waxman, Symposium: Shifting the Balance of
Power? The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Sovereign Immunity: Foreword: Does
the Solicitor General Matter?, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1115 (2001). I am indebted to Mr. Waxman
not only for his thoughtful discussion of this subject, but also for the extraordinary
opportunity to participate in these cases and others as his deputy from 1998 to 2001.
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It might be thought that the facts of the case before the Court
would have little influence on the decision of a federalism issue,
because in deciding such issues the Court draws largely on its
view of general constitutional principles concerning the structure
of government. A recent commentator has suggested, however,
that the recent federalism cases should be viewed as expressing
not the Court's view about fundamental structural questions, but
rather its view that Congress has "gone too far" in certain areas
of law and needs to be reined in. 13 If that suggestion is correct,
then the facts of the federalism cases may indeed have been
critical. A determination of whether Congress has gone "too far"
is very likely to be influenced by the facts of a case. For a Court
that was really asking that question, the choice of a factual
setting could have an important effect on the outcome, and an
effort to find cases with favorable facts was well worth making.
Of course, the Solicitor General is not always able to influence
the selection of the case that brings an issue before the Court,
because the decisions of other actors and accidents of timing may
interfere. Private parties and state governments may file
petitions for certiorari in cases with less than ideal facts. Cases
with less attractive facts may move through the courts of appeals
and become ripe for Supreme Court review before a more
attractive case reaches that stage. But in the line of cases
presenting an Eleventh Amendment challenge to the
enforcement of various anti-discrimination laws against the
states, the cases in the lower courts were so numerous that it
seemed possible to use a little case selection strategy.
The Eleventh Amendment cases had their origin in Seminole
Tribe v. Florida.14 In that case, the Court held that Congress
could authorize suits against the states only when it was
enforcing the various guarantees contained in the Fourteenth
Amendment; otherwise the states were protected by something
that became known as Eleventh Amendment immunity.15 This
holding opened the door to a vast amount of litigation
challenging the application of various federal anti-discrimination
statutes to the states. Under Seminole Tribe it was possible for
13 See Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1142
(2002).
14 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
15 Id. at 76.
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the states to argue that these statutes did not qualify as
enforcement of the equal protection clause or any other clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore the statutes could not
remove the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. To be sure,
not all states sought to invoke this immunity; to the contrary,
many states welcomed federal enforcement, but it only takes one
to raise the issue, and some state was generally eager to go
forward with this claim.
It was widely believed that in this group of statutes the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 196716 would be the
hardest to defend. Under Seminole Tribe the statute could be
applied to the states only if it was a valid exercise of
congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the Court had not been receptive to claims that age
discrimination by the government violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. Indeed, each time the Court had considered a
constitutional challenge to age discrimination, it had rejected the
challenge. 17
In order to present the Age Discrimination statute in its best
light, it would have been helpful to find a case involving
particularly irrational and harmful age discrimination, the kind
of case that was described in the legislative history as motivating
the act. An ideal case might have been one in which a person in
his forties had lost his job because his company went out of
business, and he was then unable to find a new job because he
was regarded as too old. Unfortunately, no such case appeared
among those then working their way through the courts of
appeals.
Instead, a case with much less appealing facts was heading
inexorably toward the Supreme Court - the case that became
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents.'S The Eleventh Circuit had
consolidated three cases under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, and held that all three claims were barred by
16 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634.
17 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470-73 (1991) (upholding mandatory
retirement age of seventy for state judges); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 109-12 (1979)
(upholding mandatory retirement age of sixty for federal Foreign Service officers); Mass.
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314-17 (1976) (upholding mandatory
retirement age of fifty for state police officers).
18 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
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the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states. 19 In one case,
two state college professors in their fifties claimed, among other
things, that their college had increased its requirements for
academic credentials and publications and was paying more to
new young teachers who met these standards than to older
faculty members who did not.20 In the second case, a group of
faculty members at another state university claimed that the
state had reneged on a promise to make certain market
adjustments to salaries, and this failure had a greater impact on
older employees because their wages were further below the
market than those of younger employees. 21 In the third case, a
state corrections officer who had suffered a heart attack claimed
he was not promoted in part because he could not climb the stairs
to a tower in the prison, and he claimed this constituted age
discrimination. 22
The facts of these cases had no formal relevance to the legal
question before the Court, because the Eleventh Circuit had held
that a state had Eleventh Amendment immunity to all claims
brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 23
Indeed, the Supreme Court opinion affirming that holding did
not devote much space to discussing the particular facts of these
cases.24 Nonetheless, the facts of these cases cannot have escaped
the attention of the Court. At a minimum, the facts were
unlikely to exert any pressure on the Court to find a way to
uphold the statute.
Once certiorari had been granted in Kimel, it was necessary for
the Solicitor General's Office to pursue two somewhat
contradictory goals at the same time. The first goal was to
defend the statute as a legitimate exercise of Congress's power to
19 Id. at 66.
20 Id. at 69; Complaint of Roderick MacPherson, et al., Joint Appendix Nos. 98-791,
98-796, pp. 21-25.
21 Id. at 70; Complaint of J. Daniel Kimel, et al., Joint Appendix Nos. 98-791, 98-796,
pp. 42-45.
22 Id. at 70; Complaint of Wellington N. Dickson, Joint Appendix Nos. 98-791, 98-796,
pp. 83-106. The corrections officer claimed the state's failure to promote him constituted
not only age discrimination but also disability discrimination; the state's argument that
the Disabilities Act claim was barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity was separately
presented to the Supreme Court, which granted and then dismissed the state's petition
for certiorari on that question. See Fla. Dep't of Corr. v. Dickson, 528 U.S. 1132 (Jan. 21,
2000) (granting cert.), and 528 U.S. 1184 (Feb. 23, 2000) (dismissing cert.).
23 See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66 (2000) (describing ruling below).
24 See generally id.
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enforce the equal protection clause by preventing and remedying
unconstitutional age discrimination. The second goal was to
confine any adverse decision to this one statute, to avoid an
opinion that would imply that the next statutes coming up for
review were also unconstitutional. I argued and lost Kimel in the
1999 Term; the Court held that Congress had not identified any
pattern of unconstitutional age discrimination by the states that
required a legislative remedy. 25 It seemed possible that this was
a limited loss - one that rested on the very limited record
compiled by Congress showing age discrimination by state
employers, and the fact that the Court seemed to have trouble
thinking of age discrimination as unconstitutional. The next case
proved that the holding was not so limited.
The next statute to face an Eleventh Amendment challenge in
the Supreme Court was Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990.26 Because Congress had assembled a massive record
of discrimination against people with disabilities, it seemed
possible that with the right facts the statute could be saved.
Fortunately the case about depressed government workers who
wanted a reduced workload did not reach the Court, but
certiorari was granted in a pair of cases with facts that were not
much more compelling. The first case was the corrections officer
with the heart condition - the same man who had litigated and
lost his age discrimination claim in Kimel. The Eleventh Circuit
had held that the state was immune to his Age Discrimination
Act claim but not to his Disabilities Act claim, and on the
Disabilities Act ruling the Supreme Court granted the state's
petition for certiorari.27 Four days later the Court granted
certiorari in the case of a would-be police officer whose
nearsightedness could not be completely corrected with glasses,
and the Court consolidated the two cases for argument.28
These facts did not look promising for the defense of the Act
because they involved public safety. In fact they seemed so
unfavorable that some of the private disability rights
organizations supporting the statute decided to try to promote
25 Id. at 89.
26 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117.
27 Fla. Dep't of Corr. v. Dickson, 528 U.S. 1132 (Jan. 21, 2000) (granting cert.).
28 Alsbrook v. Arkansas, 528 U.S. 1146 (Jan. 25, 2000) (granting cert. and
consolidating case with Dickson for argument).
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the settlement of those cases, and apparently they succeeded.
Both petitions were dismissed at the request of the petitioners. 29
Meanwhile a case with much more attractive facts had become
available - the case that eventually became known as Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett.30 The director of
nursing for obstetrics and gynecology at a state hospital had been
successfully treated for breast cancer and returned to work
without any limitation on her activities. She was nevertheless
demoted to a lower-ranking position because of her illness. 31 Her
case was consolidated with that of a security guard with asthma
and sleep apnea, who had asked to minimize exposure to
cigarette smoke and asked for daytime shifts in accordance with
his doctor's recommendations. 32 The state refused, and he filed a
claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. He
then began to get negative performance evaluations. 33 Both
employees filed Disabilities Act claims, and the district court
held that the claims were barred by the state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, and the
state filed a petition for certiorari. 34 The case of the nurse, who
was completely capable of doing her high-ranking job, and had
apparently been demoted only because of prejudice against
cancer survivors,35 seemed particularly attractive in light of
Justice O'Connor's well-known personal experience with breast
cancer.36 The Court took the case,37 and invalidated the statute
as applied to the states by a vote of five to four, with Justice
O'Connor in the majority. 38 Maybe that proves there really was
an important legal principle at stake here, and it could not be
29 Fla. Dep't of Corr. v. Dickson, 528 U.S. 1184 (Feb. 23, 2000) (dismissing cert.);
Alsbrook v. Arkansas, 529 U.S. 1001 (Mar. 1, 2000) (dismissing cert.).
30 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
31 Id. at 362.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 362-63.
35 Id.
36 See JOAN BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: HOW THE FIRST WOMAN ON THE
SUPREME COURT BECAME ITS MOST INFLUENTIAL JUSTICE 186-91 (2005) (noting that
Justice O'Connor first spoke publicly about her 1988 experience with breast cancer in
1994, and that she had returned to work at the Court ten days after breast cancer
surgery).
37 529 U.S. 1065 (April 17, 2000) (granting cert.).
38 531 U.S. 356 (2001). The opinion of the Court was written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.
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trumped by facts. Or maybe the facts were not quite compelling
enough.
At that time there was another case in the pipeline that
seemed to present very strong facts for defending the Disabilities
Act. In this case, which ultimately became Tennessee v. Lane,39 a
paraplegic in a wheelchair had been the defendant on trial at a
courthouse without an elevator, and as a result the paraplegic
had crawled up the courthouse steps to get to his own trial.
While the facts were compelling, the case was not ripe for
Supreme Court review in the spring of 2000, when the Court was
selecting cases that presented the claim that Disabilities Act
claims against the states were barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. The Sixth Circuit had reserved decision, awaiting
the outcome of the Disabilities Act cases in the Supreme Court.40
As it turned out, the Court in Garrett ruled only on the part of
the statute prohibiting disability discrimination in employment,
and expressly reserved for another day the part of the statute
dealing with disability discrimination in public programs,
services, and facilities.41 By the time the Court was ready to
consider the rest of the statute, the Sixth Circuit had finally
decided the case about the paraplegic on the courthouse steps.
The Court granted certiorari, and that became the case to
present the constitutionality of Title II of the Disabilities Act,
concerning access to public facilities.42 I was no longer in the
Solicitor General's Office by then, but I am sure the lawyers
there were delighted to have the statute go back to the Court on
those facts.
In Tennessee v. Lane,43 the Supreme Court rejected the state's
claim of immunity and upheld the enforcement of the Disabilities
Act against the state. 44 There can be no doubt that the facts had
an effect on the outcome in that case. The image of a defendant
crawling up the courthouse steps must have been unbearable for
39 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
40 See Lane v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d 680, 681-82 (6th Cir. 2003) (amended opinion)
(explaining that Court of Appeals had issued its initial opinion on July 16, 2002,
benefiting from guidance provided by Supreme Court's opinion in Garrett and its own
subsequent en banc decision in another case).
41 531 U.S. at 360 n.1.
42 Tennessee v. Lane, 539 U.S. 941 (2003) (granting cert. limited to ADA issue).
43 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
44 See id. at 531-34 (upholding statute as valid exercise of congressional power to
abrogate state sovereign immunity).
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the Court, or at least for Justice O'Connor, who silently joined
the Garrett dissenters in rejecting the state's claim of immunity
and upholding the portion of the Disabilities Act at issue in that
case.45 The Court explains its holding in doctrinal terms as the
result of heightened scrutiny because access to justice is at stake,
upholding the statute as applied to access to courts and leaving
parks, playgrounds, schools, and zoos for another day. 46 To this
observer, however, it seems likely that the decision resulted not
only from the analysis of legal doctrine but also, and more
importantly, from the powerful and unbearable image of a man
crawling up the courthouse steps. So maybe facts matter after
all.
Another recent case rejecting a federalism challenge may also
be explained by its compelling facts. In Nevada Department of
Human Resources v. Hibbs,47 the Court upheld the part of the
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,48 which requires state
employers, like other covered employers, to give twelve weeks of
leave for the care of a sick family member, and to pay damages
for a violation. The Court held that this law was a proper
exercise of Congress's power to enforce the equal protection
clause and to prevent and remedy sex discrimination.49 The
Court recognized that the law was written to protect both women
and men from stereotypes about family care-taking.50 Women
were protected because they most often carry the burden of being
their family's caretakers, and might for that reason suffer
employment discrimination. 51 Men were protected because they
must battle stereotypes if they need or want to care for a sick
family member.5 2
45 See id. at 513-14 (discussing facts of case).
46 See id. at 533 n.20 (stating that "[b]ecause this case implicates the right of access
to the courts, we need not consider whether Title II's duty to accommodate exceeds what
the Constitution requires in the class of cases that implicate only Cleburne's prohibition
on irrational discrimination").
47 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
48 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006).
49 See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 740 (finding FMLA "congruent and proportional to its
remedial object").
50 See id. at 736 (noting that "stereotypes about women's domestic roles are reinforced
by parallel stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for men").
51 See id. at 740.
52 See id. at 731 (explaining that prior to FMLA men were subject to discrimination
when requesting leave to care for family members).
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Hibbs can be understood in purely doctrinal terms: like Lane, it
involves a category that triggers heightened scrutiny, here sex
discrimination and there access to justice. Therefore, the Court
was more willing in each of these cases to perceive discrimination
and to find the congressional remedy appropriate. But like Lane,
Hibbs can also be explained by its facts - a husband had sought
leave to care for his wife, who had been seriously injured in an
automobile accident. 53 The facts are compelling on two levels.
First, American society depends on family members to take care
of each other. Second, the case involved a male caregiver, and
encouraging male caregivers is widely seen as essential to
reaching equality of the sexes in the workplace and at home. 54 I
think the Court found it unbearable to tell Hibbs not to care for
his injured wife, just as it was unbearable to tell Lane to crawl
up the courthouse steps.
Some have suggested that Hibbs and Lane mark a doctrinal
shift - the end of the federalism revival. Perhaps their doctrinal
significance is not so substantial; perhaps they simply show what
can happen when the Court is presented with irresistible facts.
53 The fact that the plaintiff was male may be important. Several leading sex
discrimination cases litigated by now-Justice Ruth Ginsburg before she became a judge
were brought on behalf of male plaintiffs who were disadvantaged by a pension or benefit
scheme that assumed women were dependent on their husband's benefits, but men did
not need benefits from their wives. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973).
54 For a thoughtful discussion of the possibility that Hibbs may be better explained by
changing cultural and social norms than by doctrinal analysis, see Joan C. Williams,
Symposium: Women's Work is Never Done: Employment, Family, and Activism: Hibbs as a
Federalism Case; Hibbs as a Maternal Wall Case, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 365 (2004).
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